1 /* -*- c-file-style: "linux" -*-
3 * Copyright (C) 1996-2000 by Andrew Tridgell
4 * Copyright (C) Paul Mackerras 1996
5 * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002 by Martin Pool <mbp@samba.org>
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
25 * Utilities used in rsync
32 int sanitize_paths = 0;
37 * Set a fd into nonblocking mode
39 void set_nonblocking(int fd)
43 if ((val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1)
45 if (!(val & NONBLOCK_FLAG)) {
47 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val);
52 * Set a fd into blocking mode
54 void set_blocking(int fd)
58 if ((val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0)) == -1)
60 if (val & NONBLOCK_FLAG) {
61 val &= ~NONBLOCK_FLAG;
62 fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val);
68 * Create a file descriptor pair - like pipe() but use socketpair if
69 * possible (because of blocking issues on pipes).
71 * Always set non-blocking.
73 int fd_pair(int fd[2])
78 ret = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, fd);
84 set_nonblocking(fd[0]);
85 set_nonblocking(fd[1]);
92 void print_child_argv(char **cmd)
94 rprintf(FINFO, "opening connection using ");
96 /* Look for characters that ought to be quoted. This
97 * is not a great quoting algorithm, but it's
98 * sufficient for a log message. */
99 if (strspn(*cmd, "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
100 "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
102 ",.-_=+@/") != strlen(*cmd)) {
103 rprintf(FINFO, "\"%s\" ", *cmd);
105 rprintf(FINFO, "%s ", *cmd);
108 rprintf(FINFO, "\n");
112 void out_of_memory(char *str)
114 rprintf(FERROR,"ERROR: out of memory in %s\n",str);
115 exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
118 void overflow(char *str)
120 rprintf(FERROR,"ERROR: buffer overflow in %s\n",str);
121 exit_cleanup(RERR_MALLOC);
126 int set_modtime(char *fname, time_t modtime)
133 rprintf(FINFO, "set modtime of %s to (%ld) %s",
134 fname, (long) modtime,
135 asctime(localtime(&modtime)));
141 tbuf.actime = time(NULL);
142 tbuf.modtime = modtime;
143 return utime(fname,&tbuf);
144 #elif defined(HAVE_UTIME)
148 return utime(fname,t);
151 t[0].tv_sec = time(NULL);
153 t[1].tv_sec = modtime;
155 return utimes(fname,t);
162 Create any necessary directories in fname. Unfortunately we don't know
163 what perms to give the directory when this is called so we need to rely
166 int create_directory_path(char *fname, int base_umask)
170 while (*fname == '/') fname++;
171 while (strncmp(fname,"./",2)==0) fname += 2;
174 while ((p=strchr(p,'/'))) {
176 do_mkdir(fname, 0777 & ~base_umask);
185 * Write @p len bytes at @p ptr to descriptor @p desc, retrying if
188 * @retval len upon success
190 * @retval <0 write's (negative) error code
192 * Derived from GNU C's cccp.c.
194 static int full_write(int desc, char *ptr, size_t len)
200 int written = write (desc, ptr, len);
208 total_written += written;
212 return total_written;
217 * Read @p len bytes at @p ptr from descriptor @p desc, retrying if
220 * @retval >0 the actual number of bytes read
224 * @retval <0 for an error.
226 * Derived from GNU C's cccp.c. */
227 static int safe_read(int desc, char *ptr, size_t len)
236 n_chars = read(desc, ptr, len);
237 } while (n_chars < 0 && errno == EINTR);
239 n_chars = read(desc, ptr, len);
248 * This is used in conjunction with the --temp-dir option */
249 int copy_file(char *source, char *dest, mode_t mode)
254 int len; /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
256 ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0);
258 rprintf(FERROR,"open %s: %s\n",
259 source,strerror(errno));
263 if (robust_unlink(dest) && errno != ENOENT) {
264 rprintf(FERROR,"unlink %s: %s\n",
265 dest,strerror(errno));
269 ofd = do_open(dest, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL, mode);
271 rprintf(FERROR,"open %s: %s\n",
272 dest,strerror(errno));
277 while ((len = safe_read(ifd, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
278 if (full_write(ofd, buf, len) < 0) {
279 rprintf(FERROR,"write %s: %s\n",
280 dest,strerror(errno));
291 rprintf(FERROR,"read %s: %s\n",
292 source,strerror(errno));
299 /* MAX_RENAMES should be 10**MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS */
300 #define MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS 3
301 #define MAX_RENAMES 1000
304 * Robust unlink: some OS'es (HPUX) refuse to unlink busy files, so
305 * rename to <path>/.rsyncNNN instead.
307 * Note that successive rsync runs will shuffle the filenames around a
308 * bit as long as the file is still busy; this is because this function
309 * does not know if the unlink call is due to a new file coming in, or
310 * --delete trying to remove old .rsyncNNN files, hence it renames it
313 int robust_unlink(char *fname)
316 return do_unlink(fname);
318 static int counter = 1;
320 char path[MAXPATHLEN];
322 rc = do_unlink(fname);
323 if ((rc == 0) || (errno != ETXTBSY))
326 strlcpy(path, fname, MAXPATHLEN);
329 while((path[--pos] != '/') && (pos >= 0))
332 strlcpy(&path[pos], ".rsync", MAXPATHLEN-pos);
333 pos += sizeof(".rsync")-1;
335 if (pos > (MAXPATHLEN-MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS-1)) {
340 /* start where the last one left off to reduce chance of clashes */
343 sprintf(&path[pos], "%03d", counter);
344 if (++counter >= MAX_RENAMES)
346 } while (((rc = access(path, 0)) == 0) && (counter != start));
349 rprintf(FINFO,"renaming %s to %s because of text busy\n",
353 /* maybe we should return rename()'s exit status? Nah. */
354 if (do_rename(fname, path) != 0) {
362 int robust_rename(char *from, char *to)
365 return do_rename(from, to);
367 int rc = do_rename(from, to);
368 if ((rc == 0) || (errno != ETXTBSY))
370 if (robust_unlink(to) != 0)
372 return do_rename(from, to);
377 static pid_t all_pids[10];
380 /** Fork and record the pid of the child. **/
383 pid_t newpid = fork();
385 if (newpid != 0 && newpid != -1) {
386 all_pids[num_pids++] = newpid;
394 * @todo It would be kind of nice to make sure that they are actually
395 * all our children before we kill them, because their pids may have
396 * been recycled by some other process. Perhaps when we wait for a
397 * child, we should remove it from this array. Alternatively we could
398 * perhaps use process groups, but I think that would not work on
399 * ancient Unix versions that don't support them.
401 void kill_all(int sig)
405 for (i = 0; i < num_pids; i++) {
406 /* Let's just be a little careful where we
407 * point that gun, hey? See kill(2) for the
408 * magic caused by negative values. */
409 pid_t p = all_pids[i];
421 /** Turn a user name into a uid */
422 int name_to_uid(char *name, uid_t *uid)
425 if (!name || !*name) return 0;
426 pass = getpwnam(name);
434 /** Turn a group name into a gid */
435 int name_to_gid(char *name, gid_t *gid)
438 if (!name || !*name) return 0;
439 grp = getgrnam(name);
448 /** Lock a byte range in a open file */
449 int lock_range(int fd, int offset, int len)
453 lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
454 lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
455 lock.l_start = offset;
459 return fcntl(fd,F_SETLK,&lock) == 0;
462 static int exclude_server_path(char *arg)
465 extern struct exclude_struct **server_exclude_list;
467 if (server_exclude_list) {
468 for (s = arg; (s = strchr(s, '/')) != NULL; ) {
470 if (check_exclude(server_exclude_list, arg, 1)) {
471 /* We must leave arg truncated! */
480 static void glob_expand_one(char *s, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
482 #if !(defined(HAVE_GLOB) && defined(HAVE_GLOB_H))
484 s = argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
485 exclude_server_path(s);
488 extern int sanitize_paths;
494 s = argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
495 if (sanitize_paths) {
496 sanitize_path(s, NULL);
499 memset(&globbuf, 0, sizeof(globbuf));
500 if (!exclude_server_path(s))
501 glob(s, 0, NULL, &globbuf);
502 if (globbuf.gl_pathc == 0) {
507 for (i=0; i<(maxargs - (*argc)) && i < (int) globbuf.gl_pathc;i++) {
509 argv[(*argc) + i] = strdup(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]);
510 if (!argv[(*argc) + i]) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
517 /* This routine is only used in daemon mode. */
518 void glob_expand(char *base1, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
520 char *s = argv[*argc];
523 int base_len = strlen(base);
525 if (!s || !*s) return;
527 if (strncmp(s, base, base_len) == 0)
531 if (!s) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
533 if (asprintf(&base," %s/", base1) <= 0) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
537 while ((p = strstr(q,base)) && ((*argc) < maxargs)) {
538 /* split it at this point */
540 glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
544 if (*q && (*argc < maxargs)) glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
551 * Convert a string to lower case
553 void strlower(char *s)
556 if (isupper(* (unsigned char *) s))
557 *s = tolower(* (unsigned char *) s);
562 void *Realloc(void *p, int size)
564 if (!p) return (void *)malloc(size);
565 return (void *)realloc(p, size);
569 void clean_fname(char *name)
580 if ((p=strstr(name,"/./"))) {
588 if ((p=strstr(name,"//"))) {
596 if (strncmp(p=name,"./",2) == 0) {
604 if (l > 1 && p[l-1] == '/') {
612 * Make path appear as if a chroot had occurred:
614 * @li 1. remove leading "/" (or replace with "." if at end)
616 * @li 2. remove leading ".." components (except those allowed by @p reldir)
618 * @li 3. delete any other "<dir>/.." (recursively)
620 * Can only shrink paths, so sanitizes in place.
622 * While we're at it, remove double slashes and "." components like
623 * clean_fname() does, but DON'T remove a trailing slash because that
624 * is sometimes significant on command line arguments.
626 * If @p reldir is non-null, it is a sanitized directory that the path will be
627 * relative to, so allow as many ".." at the beginning of the path as
628 * there are components in reldir. This is used for symbolic link targets.
629 * If reldir is non-null and the path began with "/", to be completely like
630 * a chroot we should add in depth levels of ".." at the beginning of the
631 * path, but that would blow the assumption that the path doesn't grow and
632 * it is not likely to end up being a valid symlink anyway, so just do
633 * the normal removal of the leading "/" instead.
635 * Contributed by Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
637 void sanitize_path(char *p, char *reldir)
646 if (*reldir++ == '/') {
654 /* remove leading slashes */
658 /* this loop iterates once per filename component in p.
659 * both p (and sanp if the original had a slash) should
660 * always be left pointing after a slash
662 if ((*p == '.') && ((*(p+1) == '/') || (*(p+1) == '\0'))) {
663 /* skip "." component */
664 while (*++p == '/') {
665 /* skip following slashes */
671 if ((*p == '.') && (*(p+1) == '.') &&
672 ((*(p+2) == '/') || (*(p+2) == '\0'))) {
673 /* ".." component followed by slash or end */
674 if ((depth > 0) && (sanp == start)) {
675 /* allow depth levels of .. at the beginning */
683 /* back up sanp one level */
684 --sanp; /* now pointing at slash */
685 while ((sanp > start) && (*(sanp - 1) != '/')) {
686 /* skip back up to slash */
694 /* copy one component through next slash */
696 if ((*p == '\0') || (*(p-1) == '/')) {
698 /* skip multiple slashes */
705 /* move the virtual beginning to leave the .. alone */
709 if ((sanp == start) && !allowdotdot) {
710 /* ended up with nothing, so put in "." component */
712 * note that the !allowdotdot doesn't prevent this from
713 * happening in all allowed ".." situations, but I didn't
714 * think it was worth putting in an extra variable to ensure
715 * it since an extra "." won't hurt in those situations.
723 char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
726 * Like chdir() but can be reversed with pop_dir() if @p save is set.
727 * It is also much faster as it remembers where we have been.
729 char *push_dir(char *dir, int save)
731 char *ret = curr_dir;
732 static int initialised;
736 getcwd(curr_dir, sizeof(curr_dir)-1);
739 if (!dir) return NULL; /* this call was probably just to initialize */
741 if (chdir(dir)) return NULL;
744 ret = strdup(curr_dir);
748 strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
749 } else if (dir[0] != '.' || dir[1] != '\0') {
750 strlcat(curr_dir,"/", sizeof(curr_dir));
751 strlcat(curr_dir,dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
754 clean_fname(curr_dir);
759 /** Reverse a push_dir() call */
760 int pop_dir(char *dir)
770 strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
777 /** We need to supply our own strcmp function for file list comparisons
778 to ensure that signed/unsigned usage is consistent between machines. */
779 int u_strcmp(const char *cs1, const char *cs2)
781 const uchar *s1 = (const uchar *)cs1;
782 const uchar *s2 = (const uchar *)cs2;
784 while (*s1 && *s2 && (*s1 == *s2)) {
788 return (int)*s1 - (int)*s2;
794 * Determine if a symlink points outside the current directory tree.
795 * This is considered "unsafe" because e.g. when mirroring somebody
796 * else's machine it might allow them to establish a symlink to
797 * /etc/passwd, and then read it through a web server.
799 * Null symlinks and absolute symlinks are always unsafe.
801 * Basically here we are concerned with symlinks whose target contains
802 * "..", because this might cause us to walk back up out of the
803 * transferred directory. We are not allowed to go back up and
806 * @param dest Target of the symlink in question.
808 * @param src Top source directory currently applicable. Basically this
809 * is the first parameter to rsync in a simple invocation, but it's
810 * modified by flist.c in slightly complex ways.
812 * @retval True if unsafe
813 * @retval False is unsafe
817 int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
819 const char *name, *slash;
822 /* all absolute and null symlinks are unsafe */
823 if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/') return 1;
825 /* find out what our safety margin is */
826 for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
827 if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
829 } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
835 if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
838 for (name = dest; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
839 if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
840 /* if at any point we go outside the current directory
841 then stop - it is unsafe */
844 } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
850 if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
858 * Return the date and time as a string
860 char *timestring(time_t t)
862 static char TimeBuf[200];
863 struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
866 strftime(TimeBuf,sizeof(TimeBuf)-1,"%Y/%m/%d %T",tm);
868 strlcpy(TimeBuf, asctime(tm), sizeof(TimeBuf));
871 if (TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] == '\n') {
872 TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] = 0;
880 * Sleep for a specified number of milliseconds.
882 * Always returns TRUE. (In the future it might return FALSE if
888 struct timeval tval,t1,t2;
890 gettimeofday(&t1, NULL);
891 gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
894 tval.tv_sec = (t-tdiff)/1000;
895 tval.tv_usec = 1000*((t-tdiff)%1000);
898 select(0,NULL,NULL, NULL, &tval);
900 gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
901 tdiff = (t2.tv_sec - t1.tv_sec)*1000 +
902 (t2.tv_usec - t1.tv_usec)/1000;
910 * Determine if two file modification times are equivalent (either
911 * exact or in the modification timestamp window established by
914 * @retval 0 if the times should be treated as the same
916 * @retval +1 if the first is later
918 * @retval -1 if the 2nd is later
920 int cmp_modtime(time_t file1, time_t file2)
922 extern int modify_window;
925 if (file2 - file1 <= modify_window) return 0;
928 if (file1 - file2 <= modify_window) return 0;
937 This routine is a trick to immediately catch errors when debugging
938 with insure. A xterm with a gdb is popped up when insure catches
939 a error. It is Linux specific.
941 int _Insure_trap_error(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6)
947 asprintf(&cmd, "/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -display :0 -T Panic -n Panic -e /bin/sh -c 'cat /tmp/ierrs.*.%d ; gdb /proc/%d/exe %d'",
948 getpid(), getpid(), getpid());
952 h = dlopen("/usr/local/parasoft/insure++lite/lib.linux2/libinsure.so", RTLD_LAZY);
953 fn = dlsym(h, "_Insure_trap_error");
956 ret = fn(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6);