+
+/* MAX_RENAMES should be 10**MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS */
+#define MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS 3
+#define MAX_RENAMES 1000
+
+/**
+ * Robust unlink: some OS'es (HPUX) refuse to unlink busy files, so
+ * rename to <path>/.rsyncNNN instead.
+ *
+ * Note that successive rsync runs will shuffle the filenames around a
+ * bit as long as the file is still busy; this is because this function
+ * does not know if the unlink call is due to a new file coming in, or
+ * --delete trying to remove old .rsyncNNN files, hence it renames it
+ * each time.
+ **/
+int robust_unlink(char *fname)
+{
+#ifndef ETXTBSY
+ return do_unlink(fname);
+#else
+ static int counter = 1;
+ int rc, pos, start;
+ char path[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ rc = do_unlink(fname);
+ if ((rc == 0) || (errno != ETXTBSY))
+ return rc;
+
+ strlcpy(path, fname, MAXPATHLEN);
+
+ pos = strlen(path);
+ while((path[--pos] != '/') && (pos >= 0))
+ ;
+ ++pos;
+ strlcpy(&path[pos], ".rsync", MAXPATHLEN-pos);
+ pos += sizeof(".rsync")-1;
+
+ if (pos > (MAXPATHLEN-MAX_RENAMES_DIGITS-1)) {
+ errno = ETXTBSY;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* start where the last one left off to reduce chance of clashes */
+ start = counter;
+ do {
+ sprintf(&path[pos], "%03d", counter);
+ if (++counter >= MAX_RENAMES)
+ counter = 1;
+ } while (((rc = access(path, 0)) == 0) && (counter != start));
+
+ if (verbose > 0)
+ rprintf(FINFO,"renaming %s to %s because of text busy\n",
+ fname, path);
+
+ /* maybe we should return rename()'s exit status? Nah. */
+ if (do_rename(fname, path) != 0) {
+ errno = ETXTBSY;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int robust_rename(char *from, char *to)
+{
+#ifndef ETXTBSY
+ return do_rename(from, to);
+#else
+ int rc = do_rename(from, to);
+ if ((rc == 0) || (errno != ETXTBSY))
+ return rc;
+ if (robust_unlink(to) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return do_rename(from, to);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static pid_t all_pids[10];
+static int num_pids;
+
+/** Fork and record the pid of the child. **/
+pid_t do_fork(void)
+{
+ pid_t newpid = fork();
+
+ if (newpid != 0 && newpid != -1) {
+ all_pids[num_pids++] = newpid;
+ }
+ return newpid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Kill all children.
+ *
+ * @todo It would be kind of nice to make sure that they are actually
+ * all our children before we kill them, because their pids may have
+ * been recycled by some other process. Perhaps when we wait for a
+ * child, we should remove it from this array. Alternatively we could
+ * perhaps use process groups, but I think that would not work on
+ * ancient Unix versions that don't support them.
+ **/
+void kill_all(int sig)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_pids; i++) {
+ /* Let's just be a little careful where we
+ * point that gun, hey? See kill(2) for the
+ * magic caused by negative values. */
+ pid_t p = all_pids[i];
+
+ if (p == getpid())
+ continue;
+ if (p <= 0)
+ continue;
+
+ kill(p, sig);
+ }
+}
+
+
+/** Turn a user name into a uid */
+int name_to_uid(char *name, uid_t *uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pass;
+ if (!name || !*name) return 0;
+ pass = getpwnam(name);
+ if (pass) {
+ *uid = pass->pw_uid;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Turn a group name into a gid */
+int name_to_gid(char *name, gid_t *gid)
+{
+ struct group *grp;
+ if (!name || !*name) return 0;
+ grp = getgrnam(name);
+ if (grp) {
+ *gid = grp->gr_gid;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/** Lock a byte range in a open file */
+int lock_range(int fd, int offset, int len)
+{
+ struct flock lock;
+
+ lock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+ lock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+ lock.l_start = offset;
+ lock.l_len = len;
+ lock.l_pid = 0;
+
+ return fcntl(fd,F_SETLK,&lock) == 0;
+}
+
+
+static void glob_expand_one(char *s, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
+{
+#if !(defined(HAVE_GLOB) && defined(HAVE_GLOB_H))
+ if (!*s) s = ".";
+ argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
+ (*argc)++;
+ return;
+#else
+ extern int sanitize_paths;
+ glob_t globbuf;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!*s) s = ".";
+
+ argv[*argc] = strdup(s);
+ if (sanitize_paths) {
+ sanitize_path(argv[*argc], NULL);
+ }
+
+ memset(&globbuf, 0, sizeof(globbuf));
+ glob(argv[*argc], 0, NULL, &globbuf);
+ if (globbuf.gl_pathc == 0) {
+ (*argc)++;
+ globfree(&globbuf);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i<(maxargs - (*argc)) && i < (int) globbuf.gl_pathc;i++) {
+ if (i == 0) free(argv[*argc]);
+ argv[(*argc) + i] = strdup(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]);
+ if (!argv[(*argc) + i]) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
+ }
+ globfree(&globbuf);
+ (*argc) += i;
+#endif
+}
+
+void glob_expand(char *base1, char **argv, int *argc, int maxargs)
+{
+ char *s = argv[*argc];
+ char *p, *q;
+ char *base = base1;
+
+ if (!s || !*s) return;
+
+ if (strncmp(s, base, strlen(base)) == 0) {
+ s += strlen(base);
+ }
+
+ s = strdup(s);
+ if (!s) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
+
+ if (asprintf(&base," %s/", base1) <= 0) out_of_memory("glob_expand");
+
+ q = s;
+ while ((p = strstr(q,base)) && ((*argc) < maxargs)) {
+ /* split it at this point */
+ *p = 0;
+ glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
+ q = p+strlen(base);
+ }
+
+ if (*q && (*argc < maxargs)) glob_expand_one(q, argv, argc, maxargs);
+
+ free(s);
+ free(base);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Convert a string to lower case
+ **/
+void strlower(char *s)
+{
+ while (*s) {
+ if (isupper(* (unsigned char *) s))
+ *s = tolower(* (unsigned char *) s);
+ s++;
+ }
+}
+
+void *Realloc(void *p, int size)
+{
+ if (!p) return (void *)malloc(size);
+ return (void *)realloc(p, size);
+}
+
+
+void clean_fname(char *name)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int l;
+ int modified = 1;
+
+ if (!name) return;
+
+ while (modified) {
+ modified = 0;
+
+ if ((p=strstr(name,"/./"))) {
+ modified = 1;
+ while (*p) {
+ p[0] = p[2];
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((p=strstr(name,"//"))) {
+ modified = 1;
+ while (*p) {
+ p[0] = p[1];
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(p=name,"./",2) == 0) {
+ modified = 1;
+ do {
+ p[0] = p[2];
+ } while (*p++);
+ }
+
+ l = strlen(p=name);
+ if (l > 1 && p[l-1] == '/') {
+ modified = 1;
+ p[l-1] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make path appear as if a chroot had occurred:
+ *
+ * @li 1. remove leading "/" (or replace with "." if at end)
+ *
+ * @li 2. remove leading ".." components (except those allowed by @p reldir)
+ *
+ * @li 3. delete any other "<dir>/.." (recursively)
+ *
+ * Can only shrink paths, so sanitizes in place.
+ *
+ * While we're at it, remove double slashes and "." components like
+ * clean_fname() does, but DON'T remove a trailing slash because that
+ * is sometimes significant on command line arguments.
+ *
+ * If @p reldir is non-null, it is a sanitized directory that the path will be
+ * relative to, so allow as many ".." at the beginning of the path as
+ * there are components in reldir. This is used for symbolic link targets.
+ * If reldir is non-null and the path began with "/", to be completely like
+ * a chroot we should add in depth levels of ".." at the beginning of the
+ * path, but that would blow the assumption that the path doesn't grow and
+ * it is not likely to end up being a valid symlink anyway, so just do
+ * the normal removal of the leading "/" instead.
+ *
+ * Contributed by Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
+ */
+void sanitize_path(char *p, char *reldir)
+{
+ char *start, *sanp;
+ int depth = 0;
+ int allowdotdot = 0;
+
+ if (reldir) {
+ depth++;
+ while (*reldir) {
+ if (*reldir++ == '/') {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ start = p;
+ sanp = p;
+ while (*p == '/') {
+ /* remove leading slashes */
+ p++;
+ }
+ while (*p != '\0') {
+ /* this loop iterates once per filename component in p.
+ * both p (and sanp if the original had a slash) should
+ * always be left pointing after a slash
+ */
+ if ((*p == '.') && ((*(p+1) == '/') || (*(p+1) == '\0'))) {
+ /* skip "." component */
+ while (*++p == '/') {
+ /* skip following slashes */
+ ;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ allowdotdot = 0;
+ if ((*p == '.') && (*(p+1) == '.') &&
+ ((*(p+2) == '/') || (*(p+2) == '\0'))) {
+ /* ".." component followed by slash or end */
+ if ((depth > 0) && (sanp == start)) {
+ /* allow depth levels of .. at the beginning */
+ --depth;
+ allowdotdot = 1;
+ } else {
+ p += 2;
+ if (*p == '/')
+ p++;
+ if (sanp != start) {
+ /* back up sanp one level */
+ --sanp; /* now pointing at slash */
+ while ((sanp > start) && (*(sanp - 1) != '/')) {
+ /* skip back up to slash */
+ sanp--;
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ while (1) {
+ /* copy one component through next slash */
+ *sanp++ = *p++;
+ if ((*p == '\0') || (*(p-1) == '/')) {
+ while (*p == '/') {
+ /* skip multiple slashes */
+ p++;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (allowdotdot) {
+ /* move the virtual beginning to leave the .. alone */
+ start = sanp;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((sanp == start) && !allowdotdot) {
+ /* ended up with nothing, so put in "." component */
+ /*
+ * note that the !allowdotdot doesn't prevent this from
+ * happening in all allowed ".." situations, but I didn't
+ * think it was worth putting in an extra variable to ensure
+ * it since an extra "." won't hurt in those situations.
+ */
+ *sanp++ = '.';
+ }
+ *sanp = '\0';
+}
+
+
+static char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+/**
+ * Like chdir() but can be reversed with pop_dir() if @p save is set.
+ * It is also much faster as it remembers where we have been.
+ **/
+char *push_dir(char *dir, int save)
+{
+ char *ret = curr_dir;
+ static int initialised;
+
+ if (!initialised) {
+ initialised = 1;
+ getcwd(curr_dir, sizeof(curr_dir)-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!dir) return NULL; /* this call was probably just to initialize */
+
+ if (chdir(dir)) return NULL;
+
+ if (save) {
+ ret = strdup(curr_dir);
+ }
+
+ if (*dir == '/') {
+ strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+ } else {
+ strlcat(curr_dir,"/", sizeof(curr_dir));
+ strlcat(curr_dir,dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+ }
+
+ clean_fname(curr_dir);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Reverse a push_dir() call */
+int pop_dir(char *dir)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = chdir(dir);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(dir);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+
+ free(dir);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** We need to supply our own strcmp function for file list comparisons
+ to ensure that signed/unsigned usage is consistent between machines. */
+int u_strcmp(const char *cs1, const char *cs2)
+{
+ const uchar *s1 = (const uchar *)cs1;
+ const uchar *s2 = (const uchar *)cs2;
+
+ while (*s1 && *s2 && (*s1 == *s2)) {
+ s1++; s2++;
+ }
+
+ return (int)*s1 - (int)*s2;
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+ * Determine if a symlink points outside the current directory tree.
+ * This is considered "unsafe" because e.g. when mirroring somebody
+ * else's machine it might allow them to establish a symlink to
+ * /etc/passwd, and then read it through a web server.
+ *
+ * Null symlinks and absolute symlinks are always unsafe.
+ *
+ * Basically here we are concerned with symlinks whose target contains
+ * "..", because this might cause us to walk back up out of the
+ * transferred directory. We are not allowed to go back up and
+ * reenter.
+ *
+ * @param dest Target of the symlink in question.
+ *
+ * @param src Top source directory currently applicable. Basically this
+ * is the first parameter to rsync in a simple invocation, but it's
+ * modified by flist.c in slightly complex ways.
+ *
+ * @retval True if unsafe
+ * @retval False is unsafe
+ *
+ * @sa t_unsafe.c
+ **/
+int unsafe_symlink(char *dest, char *src)
+{
+ char *tok;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ /* all absolute and null symlinks are unsafe */
+ if (!dest || !(*dest) || (*dest == '/')) return 1;
+
+ src = strdup(src);
+ if (!src) out_of_memory("unsafe_symlink");
+
+ /* find out what our safety margin is */
+ for (tok=strtok(src,"/"); tok; tok=strtok(NULL,"/")) {
+ if (strcmp(tok,"..") == 0) {
+ depth=0;
+ } else if (strcmp(tok,".") == 0) {
+ /* nothing */
+ } else {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+ free(src);
+
+ /* drop by one to account for the filename portion */
+ depth--;
+
+ dest = strdup(dest);
+ if (!dest) out_of_memory("unsafe_symlink");
+
+ for (tok=strtok(dest,"/"); tok; tok=strtok(NULL,"/")) {
+ if (strcmp(tok,"..") == 0) {
+ depth--;
+ } else if (strcmp(tok,".") == 0) {
+ /* nothing */
+ } else {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ /* if at any point we go outside the current directory then
+ stop - it is unsafe */
+ if (depth < 0) break;
+ }
+
+ free(dest);
+ return (depth < 0);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Return the date and time as a string
+ **/
+char *timestring(time_t t)
+{
+ static char TimeBuf[200];
+ struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ strftime(TimeBuf,sizeof(TimeBuf)-1,"%Y/%m/%d %T",tm);
+#else
+ strlcpy(TimeBuf, asctime(tm), sizeof(TimeBuf));
+#endif
+
+ if (TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] == '\n') {
+ TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ return(TimeBuf);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Sleep for a specified number of milliseconds.
+ *
+ * Always returns TRUE. (In the future it might return FALSE if
+ * interrupted.)
+ **/
+int msleep(int t)
+{
+ int tdiff=0;
+ struct timeval tval,t1,t2;
+
+ gettimeofday(&t1, NULL);
+ gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
+
+ while (tdiff < t) {
+ tval.tv_sec = (t-tdiff)/1000;
+ tval.tv_usec = 1000*((t-tdiff)%1000);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ select(0,NULL,NULL, NULL, &tval);
+
+ gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
+ tdiff = (t2.tv_sec - t1.tv_sec)*1000 +
+ (t2.tv_usec - t1.tv_usec)/1000;
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Determine if two file modification times are equivalent (either
+ * exact or in the modification timestamp window established by
+ * --modify-window).
+ *
+ * @retval 0 if the times should be treated as the same
+ *
+ * @retval +1 if the first is later
+ *
+ * @retval -1 if the 2nd is later
+ **/
+int cmp_modtime(time_t file1, time_t file2)
+{
+ extern int modify_window;
+
+ if (file2 > file1) {
+ if (file2 - file1 <= modify_window) return 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (file1 - file2 <= modify_window) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef __INSURE__XX
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+/**
+ This routine is a trick to immediately catch errors when debugging
+ with insure. A xterm with a gdb is popped up when insure catches
+ a error. It is Linux specific.
+**/
+int _Insure_trap_error(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6)
+{
+ static int (*fn)();
+ int ret;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ asprintf(&cmd, "/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -display :0 -T Panic -n Panic -e /bin/sh -c 'cat /tmp/ierrs.*.%d ; gdb /proc/%d/exe %d'",
+ getpid(), getpid(), getpid());
+
+ if (!fn) {
+ static void *h;
+ h = dlopen("/usr/local/parasoft/insure++lite/lib.linux2/libinsure.so", RTLD_LAZY);
+ fn = dlsym(h, "_Insure_trap_error");
+ }
+
+ ret = fn(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6);
+
+ system(cmd);
+
+ free(cmd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif