extern int dry_run;
extern int preserve_times;
extern int am_root;
+extern int am_server;
+extern int am_sender;
+extern int am_generator;
extern int preserve_uid;
extern int preserve_gid;
extern int preserve_perms;
if (strcmp(dname,".") == 0
|| strcmp(dname,"..") == 0)
continue;
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", fname, dname);
+ pathjoin(buf, sizeof buf, fname, dname);
if (verbose > 0)
rprintf(FINFO,"deleting %s\n", buf);
if (delete_file(buf) != 0) {
return 0;
}
-static int is_in_group(gid_t gid)
-{
-#ifdef GETGROUPS_T
- static gid_t last_in = (gid_t) -2, last_out;
- static int ngroups = -2;
- static GETGROUPS_T *gidset;
- int n;
-
- if (gid == last_in)
- return last_out;
- if (ngroups < -1) {
- /* treat failure (-1) as if not member of any group */
- ngroups = getgroups(0, 0);
- if (ngroups > 0) {
- gidset = (GETGROUPS_T *) malloc(ngroups * sizeof(GETGROUPS_T));
- ngroups = getgroups(ngroups, gidset);
- }
- }
-
- last_in = gid;
- last_out = 0;
- for (n = 0; n < ngroups; n++) {
- if (gidset[n] == gid) {
- last_out = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- return last_out;
-
-#else
- return 0;
-#endif
-}
-
int set_perms(char *fname,struct file_struct *file,STRUCT_STAT *st,
int report)
{
}
change_uid = am_root && preserve_uid && st->st_uid != file->uid;
- change_gid = preserve_gid && file->gid != (gid_t) -1 && \
- st->st_gid != file->gid;
- if (change_gid && !am_root) {
- /* enforce bsd-style group semantics: non-root can only
- change to groups that the user is a member of */
- change_gid = is_in_group(file->gid);
- }
+ change_gid = preserve_gid && file->gid != GID_NONE
+ && st->st_gid != file->gid;
if (change_uid || change_gid) {
if (do_lchown(fname,
change_uid?file->uid:st->st_uid,
change_gid?file->gid:st->st_gid) != 0) {
/* shouldn't have attempted to change uid or gid
unless have the privilege */
- rprintf(FERROR, "chown %s failed: %s\n",
+ rprintf(FERROR, "%s %s failed: %s\n",
+ change_uid ? "chown" : "chgrp",
full_fname(fname), strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
void sig_int(void)
{
+ /* KLUGE: if the user hits Ctrl-C while ssh is prompting
+ * for a password, then our cleanup's sending of a SIGUSR1
+ * signal to all our children may kill ssh before it has a
+ * chance to restore the tty settings (i.e. turn echo back
+ * on). By sleeping for a short time, ssh gets a bigger
+ * chance to do the right thing. If child processes are
+ * not ssh waiting for a password, then this tiny delay
+ * shouldn't hurt anything. */
+ msleep(400);
exit_cleanup(RERR_SIGNAL);
}
set_perms(fname,file,NULL,0);
}
}
+
+const char *who_am_i(void)
+{
+ return am_sender ? "sender" : am_generator ? "generator" : "receiver";
+}