fixed a race condition in rsync that opened a security hole. The

[rsync/rsync.git] / rsync.c

diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c
index 00c6beb..8e7b74c 100644 (file)
--- a/rsync.c
+++ b/rsync.c
@@ -304,8 +304,9 @@ static int set_perms(char *fname,struct file_struct *file,STRUCT_STAT *st,
                                        fname,strerror(errno));
                                return 0;
                        }
+               } else {
+                       updated = 1;
                }
-               updated = 1;
        }
 
 #ifdef HAVE_CHMOD
@@ -885,10 +886,18 @@ int recv_files(int f_in,struct file_list *flist,char *local_name,int f_gen)
                        continue;
                }
 
-               fd2 = do_open(fnametmp,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,file->mode);
+               /* we initially set the perms without the
+                  setuid/setgid bits to ensure that there is no race
+                  condition. They are then correctly updated after
+                  the lchown. Thanks to snabb@epipe.fi for pointing
+                  this out */
+               fd2 = do_open(fnametmp,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,
+                             file->mode & ACCESSPERMS);
+
                if (fd2 == -1 && relative_paths && errno == ENOENT && 
                    create_directory_path(fnametmp) == 0) {
-                       fd2 = do_open(fnametmp,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,file->mode);
+                       fd2 = do_open(fnametmp,O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL,
+                                     file->mode & ACCESSPERMS);
                }
                if (fd2 == -1) {
                        rprintf(FERROR,"open %s : %s\n",fnametmp,strerror(errno));