+
+
+void clean_fname(char *name)
+{
+ char *p;
+ int l;
+ int modified = 1;
+
+ if (!name) return;
+
+ while (modified) {
+ modified = 0;
+
+ if ((p=strstr(name,"/./"))) {
+ modified = 1;
+ while (*p) {
+ p[0] = p[2];
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((p=strstr(name,"//"))) {
+ modified = 1;
+ while (*p) {
+ p[0] = p[1];
+ p++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(p=name,"./",2) == 0) {
+ modified = 1;
+ do {
+ p[0] = p[2];
+ } while (*p++);
+ }
+
+ l = strlen(p=name);
+ if (l > 1 && p[l-1] == '/') {
+ modified = 1;
+ p[l-1] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Make path appear as if a chroot had occurred:
+ *
+ * @li 1. remove leading "/" (or replace with "." if at end)
+ *
+ * @li 2. remove leading ".." components (except those allowed by @p reldir)
+ *
+ * @li 3. delete any other "<dir>/.." (recursively)
+ *
+ * Can only shrink paths, so sanitizes in place.
+ *
+ * While we're at it, remove double slashes and "." components like
+ * clean_fname() does, but DON'T remove a trailing slash because that
+ * is sometimes significant on command line arguments.
+ *
+ * If @p reldir is non-null, it is a sanitized directory that the path will be
+ * relative to, so allow as many ".." at the beginning of the path as
+ * there are components in reldir. This is used for symbolic link targets.
+ * If reldir is non-null and the path began with "/", to be completely like
+ * a chroot we should add in depth levels of ".." at the beginning of the
+ * path, but that would blow the assumption that the path doesn't grow and
+ * it is not likely to end up being a valid symlink anyway, so just do
+ * the normal removal of the leading "/" instead.
+ *
+ * Contributed by Dave Dykstra <dwd@bell-labs.com>
+ */
+void sanitize_path(char *p, char *reldir)
+{
+ char *start, *sanp;
+ int depth = 0;
+ int allowdotdot = 0;
+
+ if (reldir) {
+ depth++;
+ while (*reldir) {
+ if (*reldir++ == '/') {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ start = p;
+ sanp = p;
+ while (*p == '/') {
+ /* remove leading slashes */
+ p++;
+ }
+ while (*p != '\0') {
+ /* this loop iterates once per filename component in p.
+ * both p (and sanp if the original had a slash) should
+ * always be left pointing after a slash
+ */
+ if ((*p == '.') && ((*(p+1) == '/') || (*(p+1) == '\0'))) {
+ /* skip "." component */
+ while (*++p == '/') {
+ /* skip following slashes */
+ ;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ allowdotdot = 0;
+ if ((*p == '.') && (*(p+1) == '.') &&
+ ((*(p+2) == '/') || (*(p+2) == '\0'))) {
+ /* ".." component followed by slash or end */
+ if ((depth > 0) && (sanp == start)) {
+ /* allow depth levels of .. at the beginning */
+ --depth;
+ allowdotdot = 1;
+ } else {
+ p += 2;
+ if (*p == '/')
+ p++;
+ if (sanp != start) {
+ /* back up sanp one level */
+ --sanp; /* now pointing at slash */
+ while ((sanp > start) && (*(sanp - 1) != '/')) {
+ /* skip back up to slash */
+ sanp--;
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ while (1) {
+ /* copy one component through next slash */
+ *sanp++ = *p++;
+ if ((*p == '\0') || (*(p-1) == '/')) {
+ while (*p == '/') {
+ /* skip multiple slashes */
+ p++;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (allowdotdot) {
+ /* move the virtual beginning to leave the .. alone */
+ start = sanp;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((sanp == start) && !allowdotdot) {
+ /* ended up with nothing, so put in "." component */
+ /*
+ * note that the !allowdotdot doesn't prevent this from
+ * happening in all allowed ".." situations, but I didn't
+ * think it was worth putting in an extra variable to ensure
+ * it since an extra "." won't hurt in those situations.
+ */
+ *sanp++ = '.';
+ }
+ *sanp = '\0';
+}
+
+
+char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+/**
+ * Like chdir() but can be reversed with pop_dir() if @p save is set.
+ * It is also much faster as it remembers where we have been.
+ **/
+char *push_dir(char *dir, int save)
+{
+ char *ret = curr_dir;
+ static int initialised;
+
+ if (!initialised) {
+ initialised = 1;
+ getcwd(curr_dir, sizeof(curr_dir)-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!dir) return NULL; /* this call was probably just to initialize */
+
+ if (chdir(dir)) return NULL;
+
+ if (save) {
+ ret = strdup(curr_dir);
+ }
+
+ if (*dir == '/') {
+ strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+ } else if (dir[0] != '.' || dir[1] != '\0') {
+ strlcat(curr_dir,"/", sizeof(curr_dir));
+ strlcat(curr_dir,dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+ }
+
+ clean_fname(curr_dir);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Reverse a push_dir() call */
+int pop_dir(char *dir)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = chdir(dir);
+ if (ret) {
+ free(dir);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof(curr_dir));
+
+ free(dir);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** We need to supply our own strcmp function for file list comparisons
+ to ensure that signed/unsigned usage is consistent between machines. */
+int u_strcmp(const char *cs1, const char *cs2)
+{
+ const uchar *s1 = (const uchar *)cs1;
+ const uchar *s2 = (const uchar *)cs2;
+
+ while (*s1 && *s2 && (*s1 == *s2)) {
+ s1++; s2++;
+ }
+
+ return (int)*s1 - (int)*s2;
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+ * Determine if a symlink points outside the current directory tree.
+ * This is considered "unsafe" because e.g. when mirroring somebody
+ * else's machine it might allow them to establish a symlink to
+ * /etc/passwd, and then read it through a web server.
+ *
+ * Null symlinks and absolute symlinks are always unsafe.
+ *
+ * Basically here we are concerned with symlinks whose target contains
+ * "..", because this might cause us to walk back up out of the
+ * transferred directory. We are not allowed to go back up and
+ * reenter.
+ *
+ * @param dest Target of the symlink in question.
+ *
+ * @param src Top source directory currently applicable. Basically this
+ * is the first parameter to rsync in a simple invocation, but it's
+ * modified by flist.c in slightly complex ways.
+ *
+ * @retval True if unsafe
+ * @retval False is unsafe
+ *
+ * @sa t_unsafe.c
+ **/
+int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
+{
+ const char *name, *slash;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ /* all absolute and null symlinks are unsafe */
+ if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/') return 1;
+
+ /* find out what our safety margin is */
+ for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
+ if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
+ depth=0;
+ } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
+ /* nothing */
+ } else {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
+ depth = 0;
+
+ for (name = dest; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
+ if (strncmp(name, "../", 3) == 0) {
+ /* if at any point we go outside the current directory
+ then stop - it is unsafe */
+ if (--depth < 0)
+ return 1;
+ } else if (strncmp(name, "./", 2) == 0) {
+ /* nothing */
+ } else {
+ depth++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (strcmp(name, "..") == 0)
+ depth--;
+
+ return (depth < 0);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Return the date and time as a string
+ **/
+char *timestring(time_t t)
+{
+ static char TimeBuf[200];
+ struct tm *tm = localtime(&t);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
+ strftime(TimeBuf,sizeof(TimeBuf)-1,"%Y/%m/%d %T",tm);
+#else
+ strlcpy(TimeBuf, asctime(tm), sizeof(TimeBuf));
+#endif
+
+ if (TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] == '\n') {
+ TimeBuf[strlen(TimeBuf)-1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ return(TimeBuf);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Sleep for a specified number of milliseconds.
+ *
+ * Always returns TRUE. (In the future it might return FALSE if
+ * interrupted.)
+ **/
+int msleep(int t)
+{
+ int tdiff=0;
+ struct timeval tval,t1,t2;
+
+ gettimeofday(&t1, NULL);
+ gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
+
+ while (tdiff < t) {
+ tval.tv_sec = (t-tdiff)/1000;
+ tval.tv_usec = 1000*((t-tdiff)%1000);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ select(0,NULL,NULL, NULL, &tval);
+
+ gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
+ tdiff = (t2.tv_sec - t1.tv_sec)*1000 +
+ (t2.tv_usec - t1.tv_usec)/1000;
+ }
+
+ return True;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Determine if two file modification times are equivalent (either
+ * exact or in the modification timestamp window established by
+ * --modify-window).
+ *
+ * @retval 0 if the times should be treated as the same
+ *
+ * @retval +1 if the first is later
+ *
+ * @retval -1 if the 2nd is later
+ **/
+int cmp_modtime(time_t file1, time_t file2)
+{
+ extern int modify_window;
+
+ if (file2 > file1) {
+ if (file2 - file1 <= modify_window) return 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (file1 - file2 <= modify_window) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef __INSURE__XX
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+/**
+ This routine is a trick to immediately catch errors when debugging
+ with insure. A xterm with a gdb is popped up when insure catches
+ a error. It is Linux specific.
+**/
+int _Insure_trap_error(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6)
+{
+ static int (*fn)();
+ int ret;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ asprintf(&cmd, "/usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -display :0 -T Panic -n Panic -e /bin/sh -c 'cat /tmp/ierrs.*.%d ; gdb /proc/%d/exe %d'",
+ getpid(), getpid(), getpid());
+
+ if (!fn) {
+ static void *h;
+ h = dlopen("/usr/local/parasoft/insure++lite/lib.linux2/libinsure.so", RTLD_LAZY);
+ fn = dlsym(h, "_Insure_trap_error");
+ }
+
+ ret = fn(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6);
+
+ system(cmd);
+
+ free(cmd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif